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FAMILY LAW-New Mexico Expands Due Process
Rights of Parents in Termination of Parental Rights:
In Re Ruth Anne E.
I. INTRODUCTION
In In re Ruth Anne E.,' the New Mexico Court of Appeals held, as a matter of
first impression, that a parent who is incarcerated and unable to attend a hearing to
defend against the termination of his or her parental rights is entitled to "meaningful
participation" in the termination proceeding, including the opportunity to review the
evidence presented against him or her, to ?resent evidence on his or her own behalf,
and to challenge the evidence presented.
In Ruth Anne, the court determined that although due process protections do not
vest a parent with an absolute right to be present at a termination of parental rights
hearing (TPR), the right to participate meaningfully in the proceeding is separate
and distinct from the right to merely present a defense against the proposed
termination. 3 Thus, a parent's right to due process now includes a right to have the
courts fashion a procedure allowing the parent to respond to the matters presented
"at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."4
This Note describes the historical context of Ruth Anne, as well as the rationale
of the court in reaching its decision. Additionally, it explores the implications that
this decision may have for future cases. The possible implications of this case may
extend beyond the court's holding that alternative procedures must be made
available to the parent. The ramifications could also encompass possible adverse
effects that the added alternative procedures could have on the "best interests" of
the child or children concerned.
Ultimately, New Mexico courts could find themselves having to decide between
the due process rights of a parent on one hand, and what could be the conflicting
"best interests" of the child on the other hand. The decision of the Ruth Anne court
has already influenced the outcome of several recent termination cases around the
country, including several in New Mexico;' however, the effect of the decision on
the best interest of the child doctrine is yet to be determined.

I. 126 N.M. 670,974 P. 2d 164 (Ct. App. 1999).
2. Id. at677,974P.2dat 171.
3. Id. at 674-75, 974 P.2d at 168-69.
4. See id. at 677-78, 974 P.2d at 171-72; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).
5. See In re Diamond-Jerome P., 127 N.M. 699, 704, 986 P.2d 495, 500 (Ct. App. 1999) (applying the
decision of Ruth Anne to a case involving a mother whose fear of going out on Halloween resulted in the
termination of her parental rights); see also Inre Steven, 128 N.M. 304,306,992 P.2d 317,319 (1999) (applying
Ruth Anne to a case involving an undocumented alien mother whose TPR hearing was held after her deportation
and without allowing the mother to waive her due process rights); In re Megan, 128 N.M. 618, 624-25, 995 P.2d
1060,1067-68 (Ct. App. 2000) (applying the Ruth Anne analysis to find that a mother's due process rights had not
been violated when the court allowed CYFD to present testimony via telephone rather than require them to appear
in person); West Virginia v. Pancake, 529 S.E.2d 865, 876 (W. Va. 2000) (applying the Ruth Anne decision to a
similar case of first impression, and concluding that determining whether an incarcerated parent could attend a
dispositional hearing on the termination of parental rights was within the discretion of the circuit court); In re
Adoption/Guardianship No. 6Z980001, 748 A.2d 1020, 1026 (Md. App. 2000) (applying the Ruth Anne analysis,
and finding that the Mathews balancing test favored the state's interest, and thus, representation of an incarcerated
parent by an attorney was sufficient due process in the TPR hearing).
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Ruth Anne's mother, Lorena R., placed Ruth Anne and her two sisters with a
babysitter in Albuquerque, New Mexico, and failed to return for them.6 On January
9, 1995, the babysitter contacted the Children, Youth and Families Department
(CYFD), which took the children into temporary protective custody.' Police were
able to locate the mother and notified her of the children's placement; however, she
subsequently disappeared without first contacting CYFD.8 Six months later, in July
1996,' Lorena R. reappeared and expressed a desire to regain custody of the
children, stating that she had been attending a drug rehabilitation program in
Texas.' ° After this notice, however, she failed to keep in further contact with either
the children or CYFD."
At the time the children were taken into custody, their father, Robert E., was
incarcerated in a Texas prison, serving a sentence on a felony conviction. 2 While
in prison, Robert was served with a copy of the petition for termination of his
parental rights, based on the allegation that his children were neglected and
abused. 3 He filed an answer attesting to his incarceration, stating that he was
requesting that the children's court hire an attorney to represent his
indigent, and
4
interests.'
Further, he requested to be allowed to be present at any proceedings affecting his
children's custody "as a matter of due process and equal protection of the law."' 5
He also requested an order from children's court directing that he be transported to
New Mexico to personally defend his rights, or in the alternative, that the court
grant a continuance until such time as he was released from prison and could appear
in court to defend his interests." Although an order was issued directing the
Bernalillo County Sheriff s Department to transport him from the Texas prison to
an adjudicatory hearing in New Mexico, the order could not be enforced. 7

6. Ruth Anne, 162 N.M. at 672,974 P.2d at 166.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.

11.Ruth Anne, 162 N.M. at 672,974 P.2d at 166.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id.
Id.
Id.
d
Id.

17. Ruth Anne, 162 N.M. at 672,974 P.2d at 166. Although the report is silent as to why the order was not
enforced, it is unlikely that the reason is a lack of jurisdiction, inasmuch as Robert consented to appear at trial. See
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) (waiving claim of lack of jurisdiction in the case of consent
of a defendant). It is possible that the state of Texas simply found that the task of transporting and guarding a
prisoner to the New Mexico border was either too onerous, too costly, or both. See generally Philip M. Genty,
Procedural Due Process Rights of lnearcerated Parents In Termination Of Parental Rights Proceedings: A Fifty
State Analysis 30 J. FAM.L. 757,774-78 (1991). With respect to a prisoner confined outside the state who seeks
to be brought into the state for the hearing, eight states, including Alabama, California, Connecticut, Kansas,
Maine, North Dakota, Oregon, and Washington, specify that no such right exists, although California statutes
provide that in-state prisoners have the right to be physically present at their TPR hearing. Id at 774-76. Genty
explains that the cases in these states reflect the principles articulated in a prisoner-initiated civil lawsuit, Stone
v. Morris, 546 F.2d 730 (7th Cir. 1976), where the court held that a trial court has discretion to determine whether
a prisoner should be physically produced for a trial in a civil proceeding after considering factors such as the cost,
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The court appointed an attorney to represent Robert's interests, and at the same
time appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) to represent the children. 8 On July 30,
1997, CYFD filed a motion to terminate Robert's parental rights, a motion contested
by his attorney. 9 A hearing on the merits was scheduled for November 26, 1997;
however, at the November hearing, Robert's attorney informed the court that
although Robert had been released from prison, he had been re-incarcerated on a
new charge. 2 Robert's attorney then requested a continuance to enable Robert to
appear and testify personally, upon release from his second term in prison. Robert's
request for an extension was denied, and the hearing proceeded as scheduled.2 '
Neither parent was present at the hearing to terminate parental rights, nor were
any witnesses called in their defense.22 However, their court-appointed attorney
cross-examined witnesses who were called by CYFD.23 The children's court found
that the children were abused and neglected, and that the parental bond between
parents and children had disintegrated.2 4 As a result, parental rights were
terminated.25
Robert appealed; however, his attorney filed the appeal one day after the thirtyday deadline prescribed by New Mexico Rule 12-201.26 As a result, Robert first had
to petition the New Mexico Court of Appeals to hear his case. The court
concluded that an assumption of ineffective counsel was the consequence of an
untimely appeal;' therefore, it agreed to address the merits of Robert's due process
challenge.2
Robert claimed that he was denied opportunity to participate in the trial, that he
was not allowed to present evidence in his own defense, and that he was given no
opportunity to refute the matters presented by CYFD.3 The court agreed that
Robert's due process rights had been violated.3" The order terminating his parental
rights was therefore reversed, and the matter was remanded to the children's court

inconvenience, and danger or security risk involved in the transportation, as well as the substantiality of the matter
at issue, the need to resolve the matter quickly instead of waiting until the prisoner's release, the probability of
success of the case on the merits, and the prisoner's interests in presenting testimony in person. Genty, supra, at
777. Genty then argues that a more liberal rule should be followed in lawsuits in which the prisoner is an
involuntary participant in a suit initiated by a third party, such as in a terminating proceeding. Idat 777-78.
18. Ruth Anne at 672, 974 P.2d at 166.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

25. Id. New Mexico law states that in such proceedings, the court will give primary consideration to the
physical, mental, and emotional welfare and needs of the child, and lists the factors upon which the court may
conclude that a child has been abandoned, abused, or neglected. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-28 (1978).
26. Ruth Anne, 126 N.M. at 673,974 P.2d at 167 (relying on State v.Duran, 105 N.M. 231, 232,731 P.2d
374, 375 (Ct. App. 1986), which held that the Court was to conclude ineffective assistance of counsel if the notice
of appeal was not filed within the thirty-day time limit established by Rule 12-201(A)).

27. Id. at 673, 974 P.2d at 167.
28. Id. (citing Duran, 105 N.M. at 232, 731 P.2d at 375).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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for a new hearing, with orders to fashion an alternative set of procedures to
accommodate Robert's due process rights.32
Ill. BACKGROUND
A. HistoricalBackground
Early common law did not recognize the concept of "termination of parental
rights" as a legal doctrine in the American Colonies.3 3 Custody law originated with
34
the Roman concept of patriapotestas, or "paternal power," in which a child was
35
considered to be a father's chattel, completely at the father's mercy. Under
English common law, a father could abandon his wife and children if he wished,
without fear that any court would deprive him of his parental rights, should he ever
desire to reassert them_.36 In 1873, English statutes were amended to incorporate the
"tender years" doctrine, which favored giving the mother actual physical custody
of a child under sixteen years.3 7 Although the practice of awarding the physical
custody of a child shifted from the father to the mother, there was no legal
3
mechanism in place by which to terminate parental rights in favor of the state."
The United States followed the English tradition during the early nineteenth
39
century, giving the father presumptive parental rights. In 1830, presumptive
paternal rights gave way to the "tender years" doctrine, which formed the basis of
American custody decisions until the 1980s.' New Mexico followed the national
trend until the late 1980s, when the state legislature enacted sections 40-4-941 and
40-4-9.142 of the New Mexico Children's Code. 43 This legislation clearly states that

32. Id. at 678, 974 P.2d at 172.
33. MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: THE HISTORY OF CHILD
CUSTODY IN THE UNrIED STATES 3-14 (1994).

34. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1188 (7th ed. 1999).
35. Note: This information was presented by Visiting Professor Francisco Brossini during his class on
Spanish Legal Systems, at University of New Mexico School of Law, during Fall Semester of 1998.
36. Sharon J.Fleming, Custody Standardsin New Mexico: Between ThirdPartiesandBiologicalParents:
What Is the Trend?, 27 N.M.L. REV. 547, 548 (1997); see also FOWLER V. HARPER, PROBLEMS OF THE FAMILY
486-89 (1952) (explaining that while America's view of the father's rights was not quite as harsh as England's
view, "[o]ur decisions.. did adopt the common law to the extent of holding that the primary right of custody was
in the father." Id. at 486-87. See generally Michael Grossberg, Who Determines Children'sBest Interests?,17 LAW
& HIST. REV. 309 (1999) (discussing English custody law).
37. Fleming, supra note 36.
38. Id.
39. id. at 549.
40. Id. at 549-50 (citing Randy Frances Kandel, JustAsk the Kid! Towards a Rule of Children's Choice
in Custody Determinations,49 U. MtAM1 L REV. 299, 314 (1994)).

41. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9(A) (1978) states that if a minor is under the age of fourteen, the district court

shall determine custody "in accordance with the best interests of the child." In determining the child's best interests,
the court is to consider relevant factors which include but are not limited to the following: (1) the wishes of the
child's parent or parents as to his custody; (2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian; (3) the interaction and
interrelationship of the child with his parents, his siblings and any other person who may significantly affect the
child's best interest; (4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; and (5) the mental and
physical health of all individuals involved.
42. New Mexico makes a presumption that joint custody is in the best interests of a child in an initial
custody determination until such time as the court determines that joint custody is no longer in the child's best
interests. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1(A)(1978). The statute lists factors to be considered when determining
whether ajoint custody order is in the best interests of the child, including whether the child has established a close
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New Mexico's primary concern in deciding future custody issues will be the child's
best interests."
B. Termination of ParentalRights
Termination of parental rights severs all legal rights and duties that formerly
existed between parent and child.4" The rights of a parent may be legally terminated

in one of two ways: (1) the parent may voluntarily relinquish his or her rights or, (2)
the court may terminate parental rights if it determines that the parent is unwilling
or unable to properly care for the child.' State laws pertaining to terminating a
parent's rights were historically designed to deal with parents who voluntarily
abandoned their children; therefore, the situation in which an incarcerated parent's
rights are terminated involuntarily presents a special problem in today's society.4
Prior to the 1993 revision of N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-4-28," abandonment by a
parent did not mandate court termination of the parent's rights. Instead, the decision
rested within the judicial discretion of the court. 9 Today, however, a child whose
parent is unable to discharge his or her responsibilities to and for the child because
of incarceration is adjudicated a "neglected child."' The parental rights of a child
labeled "neglected" may then be terminated by the court if there is a finding that the
"conditions and causes of the neglect and abuse are unlikely to change in the
foreseeable future."'"
1. Due Process Afforded a Parent in Other Jurisdictions in a TPR Hearing
Many jurisdictions have addressed the issue of procedural due process
requirements that must be granted to an incarcerated parent when a state is seeking

relationship with each parent. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1(B) (1978).
43. Fleming, supra note 36, at 553-54.
44. Id. at 554 (citing Barbara L Shapiro, Family Law, 17 N.M. L REv. 291, 297-98 (1987)).
45. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-29(M) (1978) (stating that the finaljudgment of the court divests the parents
of all legal rights and privileges with respect to the child).
46. LEsLiE J. HARRIS ET AL, FAMILY LAw 1299 (Uttle, Brown and Company, eds., 1996).
47. Genty, supranote 17, at 757-64 (arguing that because state laws historically were aimed at parents who
voluntarily abandoned their children, these laws are "ill-equipped to deal with the problem of parents who are
involuntarily separated from their children through incarceration but who actively strive to continue to be parents
to their children"). Genty further argues that "as a result of this inability to grapple directly with the problems
presented by parental incarceration is that parent-child relationships are needlessly and harmfully severed when
a parent is imprisoned." Id.
48. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-28 (B)(1) (1978) (stating that the court "shall terminate parental
rights.. .when there has been abandonment of the child by his parents").
49. In re Adoption of Doe, 99 N.M. 279,282,657 P.2d 134, 137 (Ct. App. 1982) (holding that prior to the
1993 statutory revision, the issue of whether abandonment has occurred during incarceration is a question of fact
to be determined on a case by case basis, rather than as a matter of law). But see In re Sara R., 123 N.M. 711,718,
945 P.2d 76, 83 (1997) (holding that even though incarceration alone is not an appropriate reason to terminate
parental rights, father's conviction for murder of the mother resulting in a long period of incarceration is sufficient
to establish that the child was neglected, and that termination of father's parental rights was justified).
50. N.M.STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-2(E)(4) (2000) (defining a "neglected child" as "a child whose parent,
guardian, or custodian is unable to discharge his responsibilities to and for the child because of incarceration,
hospitalization, or physical or mental disorder or incapacity").
51. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-28(B)(2) (2000) (stating the conditions under which the New Mexico courts
shall terminate parental rights).
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to terminate his or her parental rights.52 Additionally, almost every state has
3
reported cases that deal with incarcerated parents.5 All states require that minimum
due process, that is, reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard ,I be extended
55
to all parents who have adjudication hearings affecting their parental rights.
its
In all states, the court places the burden upon the state agency to support
5' 6 In In re Sedillo,5 7 the New
evidence.
convincing
and
allegations by at least "clear
Mexico Supreme Court set forth a particular test to describe evidence that is "clear
and convincing" in a termination case. This evidence must "instantly tilt the scales
in the affirmative when weighed against the opposition and the fact finder's mind
5
is left with an abiding conviction that the evidence is true." "
Although mandated due process must be accorded in all jurisdictions, data
indicates disagreement as to what procedure(s) must be provided in any particular
case. Instead, the amount and nature of the due process are dependent upon the
particular circumstances of each case.59 Because the supreme court of each state is
the final arbiter of a state constitution's due process requirements, the states may
°
vary in their interpretation of the procedures required.' For example, not all states
have determined that an indigent parent has an absolute right to counsel before
termination of his or her parental rights. 6'
Despite this determination, several state cases have held that an incarcerated
parent does have the right to counsel, 62 and three jurisdictions require that an
' 63
incarcerated parent at least be afforded "effective assistance of counsel. A few
states have gone so far as to conclude that a convict has no constitutional right to
personally appear in a civil suit where he or she has been permitted to appear
through counsel or deposition. Instead, they held that any right to appear personally
would ultimately be left to the discretion of the trial court." Some states that do not

52. See Genty, supra note 17, at 761 (stating that at least twenty-five states, including New Mexico, have

termination of parental rights or adoption statutes that explicitly pertain to incarcerated parents).
53. Id.

54. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1971) (citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965), for the
proposition that "it is equally fundamental that the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard 'must be granted
at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner"').
55. See Troxel v.Granville, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 2059 (2000) (relying on analyses of the decisions in cases such
as Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.702,719 (1997), Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.390, 399 (1923), and Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)).
56. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,769 (1982) (replacing the "fair preponderance of the evidence"
standard with the "clear and convincing evidence" standard); see also In re Termination of Parental Rights of
Eventyr), 120 N.M. 463,473,902 P.2d 1066, 1076 (1995).
57. 84 N.M.10, 498 P.2d 1353 (1972).
58. Idat 12,498 P.2d at 1355.
59. See e.g., In re Interest of Christopher D., 530 N.W.2d 34,42 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
60. See U.S. CONSr. amend. XIV: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."
61.

See Lassiter v. Dep't ofSoc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981).

62. Genty, supra note 17, at 779 (referring to Illinois, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, and Delaware).
63. Id. (referring to California, Iowa, and Illinois).
64. See Pignolet v. State Dep't of Pensions & Sec., 489 So. 2d 588,590-91 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986) (holding
that sufficient due process was afforded an incarcerated parent when he was given notice of the hearing, was
represented by counsel, and was given the opportunity to be heard through a deposition); In re Interest of J.S., 470
N.W.2d 48, 52 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991) (holding that procedural due process was satisfied when the parent had notice
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require a parent's physical presence at a TPR hearing instead provide other
procedural safeguards, such as the opportunity to communicate by telephone, to
provide a deposition, to review transcripts of witness testimony, and to provide
rebuttal testimony either through telephonic connection to the courtroom or by

means of deposition.65

States also vary in specificity of statutes that may eventually allow a child to be
removed from the natural parents.' A particular termination statute must be
sufficiently explicit so that it informs the concerned parents that certain conduct is
forbidden.67 If the statute fails to do this, it may be found "void for vagueness" in
violation of the Due Process Clause.
2. Traditional Due Process Afforded a Parent in a New Mexico TPR Hearing
In New Mexico, "lilt has long been the rule that [plarents have a natural and
legal right to custody of their children." Fundamental to this presumption is the
belief that parental rights prevail in a dispute between natural parents and a third
party, which includes the state, unless the parent is unfit or has abandoned the'
child.7" Statutory grounds control the termination of parental rights "by any other
person having a legitimate interest in the matter, including a petitioner for
adoption."71
The grounds upon which the New Mexico courts may terminate a parent's rights
include either actual or presumptive abandonment by the parent(s) or neglect or
abuse "unlikely to change in the foreseeable future."72 Unless rebutted by the
parent, the elements of presumptive abandonment are met if (a) the child has lived
in the home of others for an extended period of time; (b) the parent/child
relationship has disintegrated; (c) a psychological parent-child relationship has
developed between the substitute family and the child; (d) if the court deems the

of the hearing, was represented by counsel, and was afforded the opportunity to present depositional testimony);
In re Interest of L.V., 482 N.W.2d. 250, 259 (Neb. 1992) (upholding lower court's disallowance of incarcerated
father's physical attendance at hearing because the father received notice of the hearing and specific accusations
against him, was represented by counsel, was given the opportunity to call his own witness and to recall and crossexamine the State's witnesses, and telephonically participated in the hearing); In re Interest of F.H., 283 N.W.2d
202, 209 (N.D. 1979); In re Welfare of HGB, 306 N.W.2d 821,826-27 (Minn. 1981) (holding that the appearance
of court-appointed counsel was sufficient to meet the due process requirement).
65. See In re Juvenile Appeal, 446 A.2d 808, 811-13 (Conn. 1982) (holding that a parent incarcerated
outside the state was afforded procedural due process when a transcript of the state's evidence was sent to the
imprisoned parent for review and the parent later testified telephonically).
66. See Genty, supra note 17, at 782-90.
67. See Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (holding that "a statute which either forbids
or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process").
68. See Vance v. Lincoln County Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 582 So. 2d 414,418-19 (Miss. 1991) (reviewing
the Supreme Court's statements on the matter ofstatutory vagueness); see also E. EDMUND REUrrER, JR., THE LAW
OF PuBLIc EDUCATION 781 (4th ed. 1994) (citing State v. Popanz, 332 N.W.2d 750,753-54 (Wis. 1983). which
explained that while there is no "litmus-paper test" to determine statutory vagueness, the principles underlying the
void for vagueness doctrine stem from concepts of procedural due process, including fair notice of the conduct
required or prohibited and proper standards for enforcement of the law and adjudication).
69. Shorty v. Scott, 87 N.M. 490, 493, 535 P.2d 1339, 1344 (1975).
70. See Fleming, supra note 36, at 554.
71. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-16(AX1) to § 32A-5-16(A)(3) (1995).
72. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-28(B)(2) (1978).
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child of sufficient capacity to express a preference, and the child no longer prefers
to live with the natural parent; and (e) the substitute family desires to adopt the
child.73
New Mexico has generally upheld a termination statute so long as the language
relates to informed parental conduct. 74 For example, in 1983, the New Mexico
Supreme Court held that a statute that authorized the termination of the parent-child
relationship when it had "disintegrated" did not meet the standard of being "specific
and direct enough so that an ordinary person will know what conduct is sufficient
to justify termination of parental rights," was void for vagueness, and thus,
unconstitutional."
New Mexico has traditionally applied a statutorily mandated "Best Interests
Test" adapted from the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA) in order to
determine placement of a child who is caught in a dispute between two biological
parents. The factors used to determine the child's best interests include the wishes
of the parents; those of the child; the interaction and interrelationship of the child
with the parents and other family members; the child's adjustment to his/her home,
school, and community; and the mental and physical health of all individuals
involved.76 In addition, New Mexico case law supplements the five factors by
allowing the courts to apply a sixth factor in making their determination-the
77
potential negative effect that a custody change may have on a child.
New Mexico currently follows federal mandates requiring the appointment of a
guardian ad litem in cases that involve determining the best interests of a minor
78
child during any appellate proceedings in children's court. Recently, in In re
79
Adoption of J.J.B., the New Mexico Supreme Court seemed to suggest that the
child's best interests may depend not upon the genetic parent-child relationship
itself; but rather, upon whether or not a psychological bond could be established or
restored between the biological parents and the child." The outcome in the case
indicates that courts have begun to recognize that children are distinct entities from
their parents, and have begun to balance the rights and interests of each.
IV. RATIONALE
For its analysis of the due process issue, the New Mexico Court of Appeals
8
looked first to constitutionally mandated procedures. " The Due Process Clause of

73. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-15(3)(a-e) (1978).
74. See In re Adoption of Doe, 89 N.M. 606,617-19, 555 P.2d 906, 917-19 (Ct. App. 1976) (discussing
variations in the interpretation of the term "abandonment" and approving an objective definition that focused on
a "conscious disregard" of parental obligations).
75. In re Doe, 100 N.M. 92,94-95,666 P.2d 771,773-74 (1983).
76. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9(A) (1994).
77. See Schuermann v. Schuermann, 94 N.M. 81, 83, 607 P.2d 619, 621 (1980).
78. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-I-7(A) (1978) (specifying that a GAL's role is to "zealously represent the
child's best interests with respect to matters arising pursuant to the provisions of the Children's Code").
79. 119 N.M. 638, 894 P.2d 994(1995).
80. See id. at 650, 894 P.2d at 1006 (suggesting that the child's best interests may depend upon whether
a psychological bond could be established or restored between the biological parents and the child).
81. As a result of the late filing of the appeal in Ruth Anne, the threshold issue for the court to determine
was jurisdiction to hear the case. Judge Thomas A. Donnelly addressed this issue by looking to State v. Duran, 105
N.M. 231,232,731 P.2d 374, 375 (Ct. App. 1986), and determining that "a conclusive presumption of ineffective
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the Fourteenth Amendment8 2 provides citizens with both a fundamental right to
maintain family relationships and procedural protections in the case of forcible
termination of these relationships.83 These rights can be
categorized as procedural
85
due process rights" and substantive due process rights.
As this was a case of first impression in the state, the court turned to other states'
interpretation of "meaningful participation" in similar factual situations.8 6 The court
found that the only issue of agreement among otherjurisdictions was that a prisoner
incarcerated in one state does not have the right to be brought to another state for
a TPR, as long as the parent is represented by counsel and the parent is allowed an
alternative means of participation in the hearing. 7 However, in some cases, when
a continuance is deemed reasonable, the decision of whether to wait for the parent
to appear is ultimately left to the discretion of the court.8 8
The court examined the alternative means employed by the various jurisdictions,
including such procedures as the opportunity to testify through deposition, to review
transcripts of witness testimony, or to provide live testimony through telephonic
connection. 9
In reaching its determination to require "meaningful participation" of an
incarcerated parent in his or her TPR, the New Mexico Court of Appeals virtually
adopted the interpretation of the Nebraska Supreme Court.90 In In re Interest of
L V., the Nebraska court examined a similar factual situation and determined that
procedural due process would require that a parent have timely notice of the
proceeding, a reasonable opportunity to refute or defend against a charge or
accusation, a reasonable opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses and to present evidence on the charge or accusation, representation by
counsel, and a hearing before an impartial decision maker.92
Finally, the Ruth Anne court focused on the issue of whether due process in the
form of an "opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
assistance of counsel exists where a notice of appeal or a waiver of the right to appeal is not filed within the time
limit prescribed by Rule 12-201(A)." Id.
82. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law").
83. CYFD asserted that the denial of due process issue had not been preserved below; however, the court
disagreed, stating that Robert's answer to the original petition and his request for a continuance "alerted the
children's court to Father's desire to actively contest the charges against him." Ruth Anne, 126 N.M. at 673, 974
P.2d at 167; see also In re Diamond-Jerome P., 127 N.M. 699,704,986 P.2d 495,500 (Ct. App. 1999) P., at 703,
986 P.2d at 499 (stating that the failure to allow a parent to defend against the termination of parental rights is

fundamental error).
84. See Inre Interest of LV., 482 N.W.2d 250, 257 (Neb. 1992) ("When a person has a right to be heard,
procedural due process includes notice to the person whose right is affected by a proceeding, that is, timely notice
reasonably calculated to inform the person concerning the subject and issues involved in the proceeding ...and a
hearing before an impartial decision maker"(quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972)).
85. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501-02 (1977) (explaining that substantive due
process provides a citizen with the right to exercise the freedoms of life, liberty, and property without undue
interference from government through a balance of the person's rights against contrary government interests).
86. See Ruth Anne, 126 N.M. at 674, 974 P.2d at 168 (citing Genty, supra note 17, at 775-76).
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
See Genty, supra note 17 (discussing Stone v. Morris, 546 F.2d 730 (7th Cir. 1976)).
See Ruth Anne, 126 N.M. at 675,974 P.2d at 168.
See id.
at 677, 974 P.2d at 171.
482 N.W.2d 250 (Neb. 1992).
Id. at 257.
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manner"' had been afforded to Robert, using the balancing test in Mathews v.
Eldridge93 as the standard."
In its application of the Mathews test, the court first looked at the father's
affected private interest. In this case, the interest was clearly his fundamental liberty
95
interest; that is, a parent's right to custody of his or her natural children.
Therefore, Robert, as the children's natural father, had a legitimate fundamental
interest in the action, which could be adversely affected should the state prevail in
its efforts of termination. 96
Next, the court examined the extent to which the risk of an erroneous deprivation
of this fundamental interest was affected by the procedures that had been employed
in arriving at the decision to terminate.' The court evaluated the effect of having
Robert's court-appointed attorney at the TPR to cross examine witnesses called by
CYFD, the failure of the attorney to call witnesses on Robert's behalf, and the
98
refusal of the children's court to grant an additional extension. After evaluating
the procedures followed, the court stated, "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
parental rights is greatly magnified unless alternative arrangements are made to
permit an incarcerated parent... to present evidence, to consult with his or her
attorney, and to confront the witnesses called by the state." 99
The court then proceeded to the third factor, acknowledging New Mexico's vital
interest in protecting the welfare of its children." ° This state interest was balanced
against Robert's fundamental liberty interest in retaining parental rights.'" The
court determined that in refusing a continuance and neglecting to permit Robert to
participate in an alternative way in the hearing, he was prejudiced by a lack of
opportunity for "meaningful participation" at his hearing."W2
The court identified the determinative factor to be that the procedure employed
by the children's court "had the effect of increasing the risk of error by denying
' 3
Father an opportunity to defend against the charge of neglect and abandonment."'
The court stated that Robert was denied an opportunity to defend himself against
the allegations of abandonment and abuse and to present evidence on his own behalf
"as a result of the children's court's failure to implement any mechanism to allow
Father to testify on his own behalf.""' 4
The court further stated that because the parent was denied the opportunity to be
present, the only evidence put forth was that which was presented by CYFD, whose

93. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (setting forth the three factors to consider in a due process analysis (citing
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,263-71 (1970))).
94. See Ruth Anne, 126 N.M. at 677,974 P.2d at 171.
95. See In re Ronald A., 110 N.M. 454, 455, 797 P.2d 243, 244 (1990) (holding that a parent's right to

custody is one which is constitutionally protected).
96. See Ruth Anne 126 N.M. at 677,974 P.2d at 171.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 677,974 P.2d at 171 (citing as precedent, Ridenour v.Ridenour, 120 N.M. 352, 355,901 P. 2d
770,773 (Ct. App. 1995)).
101. See id.
102. Id. at 678,974 P.2d at 172.
103. Id. at 677, 974 P.2d at 171.
104. Id.
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stated goal was to terminate Robert's parental rights. Therefore, the court concluded
that Ruth Anne's father had been prejudiced by an "inability to meaningfully
participate in the hearing," and remanded the matter to the children's court for a
new hearing.'0 5
V. ANALYSIS
In making their final decision in Ruth Anne, the court mandated a role of
"meaningful participation" by Robert, but chose to leave open the final decision as
to exactly what procedure(s) will be required to fulfill the requisite "meaningful6
participation" to the individual court to determine on a case-by-case basis.'0
Furthermore, although the state's interest in the children's welfare was balanced
against Robert's parental rights, missing from the court's analysis was a
consideration of the fundamental best interests of the children themselves, apart
from the state's interest in their welfare.
The court acted in accordance with state precedent in its decision to allow Robert
to pursue his case, regardless of the tardiness of his attorney's pleading. Although
the record fails to address the reason for the delay, the fault was obviously not with
Robert himself, who certainly deserved his day in court. However, in making its
decision "not to decide" on a mandated form and amount of due process for a parent
in such a situation, the New Mexico Court of Appeals left unanswered a more
important and fundamental issue than it resolved.
For example, while declining to mandate a continuance to assure a parent's
appearance, the court certainly suggests that it would have approved of the granting
'°
of a second continuance "for a brief period of time (thirty days or so)." " In this
case, however, Robert had been granted one continuance, but was re-incarcerated
on a subsequent felony, which made the likelihood of his release in the near future
very remote. The court's lack of specificity in its opinion leaves open the possibility
of endless continuances being granted to a parent in a similar situation. In arriving
at a decision favorable to the parent, the court was influenced by those states that
have expanded the procedural rights of incarcerated and other absent parents;
however, the court chose not to make a similar expansion of the substantive due
process rights of the children involved.
Based on the balancing test in Mathews, the court indicated that the previous
New Mexico standard of due process afforded a parent by CYFD was unacceptable
for future disputes.' This decision serves not only as an additional safeguard of
parental rights; but also as clear notice to CYFD that in the future it can expect to
have to wait for the court to fashion an alternative procedure to ensure that a
parent's due process rights are not violated.

105. See id. at 678, 974 P.2d at 172.
106. See id. The rationale for leaving the ultimate decision to the individual court was that, "due process is
a.. .malleable principle which must be molded to the particularsituation, considering both the rights of the parties
and governmental interests involved." Id. (quoting the New Mexico Supreme Court in In re Valdez, 88 N.M. 338,
341,540 P.2d 818, 821 (1975)).
107. Id.
108. See id. at677,974P.2dat 171.
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The court was thorough in its examination of the alternative methods of due
process provided by courts in other jurisdictions, examining such options as
telephonic communications and an opportunity for the incarcerated parent to review
court testimony and answer through additional depositions.
Noticeably lacking, however, was a review of cases that focused more on the
substantive due process rights of the children of these absent parents. By failing to
consider the rights of the children of incarcerated parents, the court lost its chance
to move to the forefront of child advocacy, choosing instead to adopt a "middle of
the road" procedure similar to that adopted by the majority of its sister states.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
The implications of Ruth Anne can be viewed from two different perspectives;
from that of the absent parent, with a constitutional right to both substantive and
procedural due process, and from that of the child, with a fundamental right to be
raised in a stable environment. If one considers that the procedural due process
rights of a parent should take priority, Ruth Anne can be accepted as a means of
ensuring that an incarcerated parent has his or her rights protected in whatever the
individual court considers to be a "meaningful" manner. Arguably, however, one
could speculate that children's rights have actually suffered a setback in the New
Mexico courts. This viewpoint finds support in the child-centered approach of
Connecticut in Irelandv. Ireland,"° and of Indiana in Lamb v. Wenning. "0 Both of
these cases stress that "the proper role for the court... is much clearer if the focus
is placed on the child's best interests rather than the parent's rights."''.
While the holding in Ruth Anne does not specify the exact procedures that must
be present to satisfy the notion of "meaningful participation," the decision does
make it clear that an incarcerated parent of children within the jurisdiction of the
New Mexico courts must be afforded more due process than simply the right to
present a defense through an attorney against the proposed termination. A parent's
right to participate meaningfully in a TPR proceeding is separate and distinct from
the right to merely present a defense against the proposed termination. As a result
of this distinction, an incarcerated parent's right to due process now includes a right
to have the courts fashion a procedure which allows him or her to respond in a
"meaningful manner" as determined by the court." 2
In fact, this decision has already had a significant impact not only on New
Mexico jurisprudence, but also on the jurisdictions of other states." 3 The New
Mexico Court of Appeals in In re Steven also looked to its decision in Ruth Anne
for the proposition that an incarcerated mother, who was deported immediately
upon her release, was entitled to due process rights before her parental rights could
109. 717 A.2d 676,680 (Conn. 1998) (arguing that the child's best interests should always be the court's
paramount concern, while admitting that those interests "do not necessarily coincide with those of one or both

parents").
110. 600 N.E.2d 96, 99 (Ind. 1992) ("The child's welfare, not that of the parents, should be the primary
concern of the trial court").
1!1. Janet Leach Richards, Children's Rights v. Parents' Rights: A ProposedSolution to the Custodial
Relocation Conundrum, 29 N.M. L REV. 245, 254 (1999).
112. Seeid.
113. Seesupranote5.

Spring 2001 ]

PARENTAL RIGHTS

be terminated, including the right to review the evidence presented by CYFD, to
consult with her attorney, and to present evidence either in person or by telephone
or deposition. "' More recently, in In re Megan, the court reevaluated its Ruth Anne
analysis of telephonic testimony to conclude that there was no violation of due
process rights when CYFD used testimony5from out-of-district witnesses by means
of telephone, rather than live testimony."
Additionally, in In re Diamond-Jerome P., the New Mexico Court of Appeals
looked to Ruth Anne in its reversal of the decision to terminate the rights of a
mentally ill mother whose fear of going out on Halloween prevented her from
16
appearing in court to contest the charges against her." Although the instant case
focused on the rights of an incarcerated parent, the expanded notion of due process
will be available to any parent who wishes to challenge the state's motion to
terminate parental rights who can demonstrate a legitimate reason why he or she
could not attend the hearing.
The widespread effect of the Ruth Anne decision is manifested in out-of-state
decisions as well. In West Virginia v. Pancake, the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals cited the Ruth Anne analysis in its decision that whether an incarcerated
parent could attend a dispositional hearing on the termination of parental rights was
11 7 In In re
a decision that was within the circuit court's sound discretion.
Adoption/GuardianshipNo. 6Z980001, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
closely examined the Mathews test used in Ruth Anne, concluding that an
incarcerated father was not denied his due process rights when the court denied his
motion to allow him to listen to proceedings on a speaker phone or to be granted a
continuance.1 8 In In re Adoption/GuardianshipNo. 6Z980001, the court held that
the lower court procedures had been adequate to protect the appellant's interest in
a full and fair hearing." 9
Arguably of more importance, however, is the interest of the state in ensuring a
stable and loving home for each child within its borders. As parental due process
has the possibility of affecting the manner in which "the best interests of the child"
doctrine is applied to a particular case, New Mexico's commitment to such a goal
merits further scrutiny.
While Ruth Anne and similar decisions have focused on the necessity of
providing adequate due process rights to the parent, it must be noted that this
process virtually ignores the interests of the child or children involved. Although
there is limited mention made of the court's consideration of the child's substantive
due process rights in terms of the child's best interests, it is the parent's procedural
due process interests that are clearly at issue.
The tension between the substantive due process rights of the child and the
procedural due process rights of the parents poses an interesting dilemma. At some
114. See In re Steven, 128 N.M. 304,305-07,992 P.2d 317, 318-20 (Ct. App. 1999).
115. See In re Megan, 128 N.M. 618,623-24, 995 P.2d 1060, 1065-66 (Ct. App. 2000).
116. See In re Diamond-Jerome P., 127 N.M. 699,704,986 P.2d 495,500 (Ct. App. 1999) (overturning the
decision of the lower court because, relying on Ruth Anne, the court determined that Mother was entitled to
participate in a more "meaningful" way).
117. SeeWestVirginiav. Pancake, 529 S.E.2d 865, 876 (W. Va. 2000).
118. In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 6Z980001, 748 A.2d 1020, 1025 (Md.App. 2000).
119. See id.
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point, either the court or the legislature must decide whether the prevailing concern
should be the child's best interest or the fundamental right of the parent to be
involved in the child's future. °
The two interests, the one of a parent to raise his or her own child, and that of a
child to grow up in a stable household, might not always be compatible. Should one
parent be incarcerated for a long period of time, or should the crime be especially
heinous,' it is questionable as to whether a child's best interest is being served if
the child is eventually returned to the parent. 122 Further, even if the parent's
incarceration does not directly affect his or her fitness as parent, the question still
remains as to whether the child can best be served by keeping him or her in
indefinite or long-term foster care."
The court's lack of specificity in issuing its opinion thus leaves open the
possibility of endless continuances being requested and possibly granted to a parent
in a similar situation, while the children are left to languish in foster care.
Consequently, this decision may be seen as placing a greater burden on children's
court to determine just what weight will be given to the substantive rights of a child
if they are in conflict with 'the procedural due process rights of the parents.
VII. CONCLUSION
In Ruth Anne, the New Mexico Court of Appeals expanded the traditional notion
of due process previously afforded to a parent who faces termination of parental
rights. The decision mandates that procedural due process be extended beyond the
previously established right of the parent to have his or her interests represented by
counsel at the TPR hearing. The court did not go so far as to vest a parent with the
absolute right to be physically present at the hearing; however, it is clear that future
New Mexico termination proceedings must include an alternative procedure to
assure a parent's right to respond in a more "meaningful" manner.
In the future, a parent who finds him or herself unable to be physically present
at the TPR hearing can look forward to the right to expanded due process, the nature
and amount of which will be determined by the court in view of the particular
circumstances of the case. While this procedure may include telephonic
consultations, teleconferences, additional depositions, additional extensions, or
technology yet undeveloped, the court clearly must expect to accommodate a parent
in some way if the parent chooses to challenge the state's action to terminate
parental rights.

120. See Troxel v. Granville, 120 S.Ct. 2054,2074 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("It seems clear to me that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment leaves room for States to consider the impact on a child of
possibly arbitrary parental decisions that neither serve nor are motivated by the best interests of the child").
121. See In re Sara R., 123 N.M. 711,713-14, 945 P.2d 76,78-79 (N.M. 1997) (noting basis for meeting
father's due process rights before termination of his parental rights even though he had been convicted of
murdering the child's mother).
122. See Jennifer Emily Simms. "Lizzie's Law": Must We Choose Between the Rights of the Parent and
Protecting the Child?, 25 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIv. CONFINEMENT 245, 247-48 (Winter, 1999) (finding
unconstitutional a state law which terminated the parental rights of a father convicted of brutally murdering the

child's mother before the child's eyes).
123.

See id.
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Whether or not the decision to provide alternative measures to a parent who is
facing the termination of parental rights will adversely affect the best interests of
the involved child is yet be determined."2 The New Mexico court may find itself
in the unenviable position of King Solomon; that is, making the difficult choice
between the rights of a parent to secure his or her procedural due process rights to
protect against termination of parental rights, and what may actually turn out to be
the adverse interests of the child to have a safe and secure home.
PATRICIA FLETCHER SCHROEDER

124. See Richards, supra note 111, at 255 (arguing that the focus of jurisprudence should be "not on the
parents' entitlements, but on the child's needs and the best way to meet the child's needs").

